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ABSTRACT 
This study reviews the provincial funding of postsecondary education under the 
Established Programs Financing (EPF) arrangements introduced in 1977. Since 
1977, federal transfers to the provinces for financing postsecondary education 
have increased in line with the growth rate of nominal gross national product, 
rather than in line with operating costs. Because the federal transfers were 
unconditional grants, the provinces were not obliged to spend the postsecondary 
transfers on higher education. Consequently, the block grant under EPF has led to 
provincial spending restraint on postsecondary education. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Cette étude examine le système du financement d'enseignement postsecondaire 
sous le financement des programmes établis (FPE) autorisés par la loi de 1977 sur 
les accords fiscaux entre le gouvernement fédéral et les provinces. Depuis 1977, 
les transferts fédéraux aux provinces, au titre du financement de l'enseignement 
postsecondaire, ont augmenté en proportion avec le taux de croissance du produit 
national brut en terme réel plutôt qu'en proportion de la croissance des frais de 
fonctionnement des institutions postsecondaires. Parce que les transferts fédéraux 
étaient inconditionnels, les provinces étaient nullement dans l'obligation d'utili-
ser ces fonds pour financer l'éducation postsecondaire. Il en résulte que le système 
de financement inconditionnel a, en somme, ralenti les dépenses des provinces 
dans le domaine de l'éducation postsecondaire. 
INTRODUCTION 
The financial plight of Canada's postsecondary institutions has recently drawn 
considerable public attention through the news media. Much of the public concern 
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is focused on the provincial underfunding of postsecondary education.1 Since 
Canadian universities and colleges are heavily dependent upon the provincial 
governments for financial support, the provincial spending cuts on postsecondary 
education have resulted in substantial cutbacks in higher education in recent years. 
In response to the inadequate funding from the provincial governments, most 
postsecondary institutions have implemented many drastic cost-saving measures 
to cope with the financial squeeze. For example, enrolment quotas are imposed, 
salaries for academic staffs are frozen, library hours are reduced, and courses are 
cancelled. As a result of these cutbacks, college buildings are decaying, 
equipment is broken down and obsolete, library books are incomplete, and classes 
are overcrowded. While students are faced with increased tuition fees and 
enrolment quotas, academic staffs are confronted with insecure academic careers 
and shrinking research funds. Indeed, the financial situation of the universities and 
colleges has now reached a critical stage where further cutbacks could place the 
quality of higher education in jeopardy. 
The central questions are: how much did the provincial governments actually 
spend on postsecondary education? Did the provincial governments reduce their 
spending on postsecondary education? To what extent was the provincial spending 
on postsecondary education influenced by federal transfers? In order to answer 
these questions, it is necessary to examine the provincial expenditures on 
postsecondary education in relation to federal transfers. Prior to 1977, the federal 
funding of postsecondary education was financed by a conditional matching grant 
based on the province's operating costs. Since 1977, the federal government has 
replaced the matching grant with a lump-sum block grant covering the three major 
program areas: hospital insurance, medicare and postsecondary education. The 
focus of this study is concerned with the provincial spending on postsecondary 
education under the Established Programs Financing (EPF) arrangements intro-
duced in 1977. 
In spite of the growing amount of literature on federal transfers to postsecondary 
education under the EPF arrangement (Carter, 1982; Leslie, 1980; Wu, 1985), 
comparatively little attention has been devoted to the provincial expenditures on 
postsecondary education. This study analyzes the pattern of provincial expendi-
tures on postsecondary education between 1977 and 1983. In particular, an attempt 
will be made to evaluate the budgetary impact of EPF on provincial expenditures 
with respect to postsecondary education. It is hoped that this study will provide 
some useful insights into the underlying cause of provincial underfunding of 
higher education. 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE ESTABLISHED PROGRAMS 
FINANCING 
Since the EPF arrangement has been discussed elsewhere (Boadway, 1980; 
Carter, 1982; Leslie, 1980; Wu, 1985), only a general overview of the federal 
funding arrangement for financing postsecondary education will be presented 
here. In 1977, the federal government and the provinces agreed to the Established 
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Programs Financing (EPF) arrangement which changed the formula for 
financing hospital insurance, medicare and postsecondary education from three 
separate cost-sharing grants to a single block grant. Under the block funding 
arrangement, 32.1 percent of the federal transfers were allocated to postsecondary 
education, 50.5 percent to hospital insurance and 17.4 percent to medicare 
expenditures. These percentages which were based on the program cost ratios of 
the three established programs in the base year 1975-76, represented only a 
notional allocation of the EPF transfers. Since the federal transfers were 
unconditional in nature, the provinces were not obliged to spend the designated 
32.1 percent of the EPF transfers on postsecondary education. 
The calculation of the federal transfer was fairly complex. The federal transfer 
consisted of two components: tax transfers and cash transfers. The tax transfer 
consisted of a federal reduction of 1 percent of the corporation income tax and 13.5 
percent of the personal income tax. This allowed each province to receive a "tax 
room" of an equivalent amount. The cash transfer included three components: the 
basic cash contribution, the transitional adjustment payment, and the levelling 
adjustment payment. The basic cash contribution consisted of 50 percent of the 
national average per capita federal contributions to the three established programs 
in the base year 1975-76 plus $7.63 per capita.2 The transitional adjustment 
payment was made up of the difference between the basic cash contribution and the 
tax transfer in order to ensure that no province would lose any revenues by 
accepting part of the federal contribution in the form of tax points rather than cash 
payment. The levelling adjustment payment was designed to remove the 
interprovincial disparities in the per capita federal contributions. 
The main characteristic of the new funding formula was that there were no 
strings attached to the federal transfers designated for postsecondary education. 
Since the provinces were not compelled to spend the designated proportions on 
individual programs, they could spend less than 32.1 percent of the EPF transfers 
on postsecondary education if they preferred. The implication of such a fiscal 
arrangement is that the EPF transfer provided virtually no incentive to the 
provinces to undertake expenditures on postsecondary education. 
In 1982, the EPF funding formula was simplified to a great extent by the 
elimination of the three different cash components. Hence, the total federal 
contributions to the three established programs were equal to the national average 
per capita federal contribution in 1975-76 rather than 50 percent under the 1977-82 
arrangement (Perry, 1983). In 1983, the federal government extended the "six and 
five programs" to postsecondary transfers by limiting increases in the per capita 
federal contribution for postsecondary education to six percent in 1983-84, and to 
five percent in 1984-85. 
TRENDS IN PROVINCIAL FUNDING 
In order to examine the budgetary impact of EPF transfer on provincial spending, it 
is necessary to analyze the pattern of provincial expenditures with respect to 
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postsecondary education. This section presents the provincial funding trends in 
postsecondary education between 1977 and 1983. 
Table 1 shows the provincial spending on postsecondary education under the 
EPF arrangements from 1977-78 to 1982-83. Total provincial expenditures on 
postsecondary education increased from $3.4 billion in 1977-78 to $5.7 billion in 
1982-83, which represented an annual growth rate of 10.9 percent. Over the six 
year period from 1977-78 to 1982-83, the provinces spent a total of $26.95 billion. 
Table 2 presents the real provincial spending on postsecondary education from 
1977-78 to 1982-83. In real terms, total expenditures in all provinces combined 
were constant at $2 billion since 1977-78. This suggests that the provincial 
spending on postsecondary education had been frozen since the inception of EPF. 
Thus, the annual national growth rate was only 1.04 percent from 1977 to 1983. It 
is interesting to note that in 1982-83 five provinces (Newfoundland, Prince 
Edward Island, Nova Scotia, Ontario and Manitoba) had real provincial spending 
well below the 1977-78 level.3 Undoubtedly, some of these provinces experienced 
financial constraints during the economic downturn and therefore had to cope with 
cutbacks in most programs, including postsecondary education. Nevertheless, it is 
more likely that to a considerable extent the federal block grants had induced the 
provinces to curtail their postsecondary education expenditures. Over the period 
1977-83, the provinces spent a total of $12.2 billion in 1971-72 constant dollars on 
postsecondary education. 
Table 3 shows the real per capita provincial spending on postsecondary 
education from 1977-78 to 1982-83. As can be seen from this Table, there were 
large disparities in per capita spending among the provinces. In 1978-79, for 
example, Alberta spent $107.53 per capita on postsecondary education while 
Saskatchewan spent only $65.32 per capita. It should be emphasized that the per 
capita federal grant was equalized in all provinces in 1982-83 when the EPF 
arrangement was renewed (Wu, 1985). However, the uniform per capita federal 
grant did not induce the provinces to equalize their spending on postsecondary 
education. For example, in 1982-83 the per capita provincial expenditure was 
$128.93 in Alberta compared with $63.33 in Prince Edward Island. This suggests 
that the EPF arrangements had equalized the per capita federal grant rather than the 
per capita provincial spending. As well, in 1982-83 six provinces had per capita 
provincial spending lower than that in 1977-78. This implies that most provinces 
had actually cut back their spending in per capita terms since the inception of EPF. 
Conceivably, the overall provincial budgetary restraint could have contributed 
partly to the decline in provincial postsecondary education expenditures. 
The real provincial spending per full-time equivalent student is shown in Table 
4.4 In order to capture the surge in postsecondary part-time enrolment, the 
full-time equivalent student is used instead of full-time student in this Table. As 
can be seen from Table 4, there were large disparities in the real provincial 
spending per student among the provinces. While the provincial spending per 
student was $4,805 in Alberta in 1982-83, it was only $2,109 in Ontario. The 
figures also reveal that the real provincial spending per student declined steadily in 
Provincial Funding of Postsecondary Education Under 
43 the Established Programs Financing 
TABLE 1 
PROVINCIAL SPENDING ON POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION, 1977-83 
(in current thousands of dollars) 
1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 
Nf Id. 70,686 74,404 85,750 97,415 97,914 111,804 
P.E.I 16,562 1 9,154 19,618 21,432 18,643 21 ,449 
N.S. 100,801 110,033 117,335 128,575 147,583 157,505 
N.B. 80,431 87,547 95,923 109,155 118,897 143,877 
Que . 1,089,413 1,197,121 1,311,591 1 ,471,833 1,687,797 1,810,478 
Ont. 1,175,536 1,264,943 1,323,990 1,403,802 1,523,098 1,724,002 
Man . 138,137 129,079 141,029 150,010 174,240 198,081 
Sask . 115,226 113,912 134,283 119,688 162,335 184,160 
Alta. 340,000 399,672 466,021 533,818 660,527 827,397 
B.C. 322,523 373,654 456,773 514,760 641,607 617,314 
Can . 3,449,315 3,769,519 4,152,313 4,550,488 5,232,642 5,796,067 
Source: Statistics Canada, Prov inc ial Government Finance : 
Revenue and Expenditure. 
TABLE 2 
REAL PROVINCIAL SPENDING ON POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION, 
1977-83 ° 
( in constant thousands o£ dollars, 1971-72=100 ) 
1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 
Nf Id. 41,049 40,415 41,850 42,990 39,150 40,700 
P.E.I 9,618 10,404 9,574 9,458 7,454 7,808 
N.S. 58,537 59,768 57,265 56,741 59,010 ' 57,337 
N.B. 46,708 47,554 46,815 48,171 47,540 52,376 
Que. 632,640 650,260 640,110 649,530 674,849 659,075 
Ont. 682,660 687,100 646,160 619,510 608,996 627,594 
Man. 80,219 70,114 68,828 66,200 69,668 72,108 
Sask . 66,914 61,875 65,536 52,819 64,908 67,040 
Alta. 197,440 217,100 227,440 235,580 264,105 301,200 
B.C. 187,300 202,960 222,920 227,170 256,540 224,723 
Can. 2,003,100 2,047,500 2,026,500 2,008,200 2,092,220 2,109,961 
Note: a. These figures are adjusted by the GNE deflator. 
Sources: Computed from data in Table 1 and Statistics Canada, 
Nat i onal Income and Expenditure Account. 
most provinces since 1978-79. As a consequence, the per student provincial 
spending in 1982-83 was much lower than that in 1977-78 in most provinces. Of 
particular interest is that there were substantial spending cuts in some provinces. 
This was especially the case in Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island and Ontario, 
where real spending per student in 1982-83 was 24 percent below the 1977-78 
level. While the provincial fiscal restraints might have led to a reduction in 
provincial funding, the EPF arrangement had undoubtedly induced , some 
provinces to cut back their expenditures significantly on postsecondary education. 
In order to ascertain whether the change of funding arrangement in 1977 affected 
the provincial funding of postsecondary education, it is necessary to compare the 
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TABLE 3 
REAL PER CAPITA PROVINCIAL SPENDING ON POST SECONDARY 
EDUCATION, 1977-83a 
( in constant dollars, 1971-72 = 100 ) 
1 977 -78 1978 -79 1979 -80 1980 -81 1981 -82 1 982 -83 
Nf Id. 73. 10 71 . 82 74 . 1 5 75. 87 68. 71 70. 98 
P.E.I. 79. 68 85. 57 78. 22 77 . 1 5 60. 70 63 . 33 
N.S. 70 . 09 71 . 1 5 67 . 87 67. 00 69. 42 66. 96 
N.B. 67 . 97 68. 83 67. 42 69 . 1 7 68. 09 74 . 43 
Que. 100. 44 102. 84 100. 58 101 . 30 1 04 . 57 101 . 58 
Ont. 81 . 27 81 . 09 75 . 71 72. 07 70. 34 71 . 70 
Man. 77 . 91 68. 08 67 . 09 64 . 62 67. 67 69. 32 
Sask . 71 . 21 65. 32 68. 53 54. 77 66. 58 67. 95 
Alta . 101 . 46 107. 53 1 08 . 41 107. 47 116. 1 1 128. 93 
B.C. 74 . 32 79. 1 3 84. 93 83. 99 92. 82 80. 18 
Can . 85. 59 86. 62 84. 80 83. 01 85. 52 85. 30 
Note: a. Provincial expenditures are adjusted by the GNE deflator. 
Sources: Computed from Table 2 and Statistics Canada, 
Quarterly Est imates of Population for Canada and the 
Prov inces. 
TABLE 4 
REAL PROVINCIAL SPENDING PER FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT STUDENT a 
( in constant dollars, 1971-72=100 ) h 
1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 
Nf Id. 4,139 4,398 4 ,275 4,181 3,456 3, 146 
P.E.I. 3,742 4 ,278 4,066 3,971 2,930 2,868 
N.S. 2,508 2,609 2,526 2 , 442 2,436 2, 193 
N.B. 3,299 3,410 3,319 3,339 3 , 058 3, 107 
Que. 2,622 2,614 2,545 2,516 2 , 530 2,352 
Ont. 2,769 2 , 798 2,555 2,333 2, 184 2, 109 
Man. 3,215 2 , 944 2 , 989 2 , 777 2,730 2 , 574 
Sask . 3,350 3, 184 3,390 2,682 3,065 2,903 
Alta . 3,788 4,195 4,387 4,415 4,662 4,805 
B.C. 3,631 3,905 4,245 4,175 4 , 547 3,718 
Can . 2,918 2,968 2,894 2,769 2,756 2,602 
Notes: a. These transfers are calculated on a full 
basis. That is, full-time university and 
plus a full-time equivalent of part-time 
based on a conversion factor of 3 to 1 . 
b. Provincial expenditures are adjusted by the GNE deflator. 
Sources: Computed from data in Table 2 and Statistics Canada, 




pattern of provincial postsecondary education expenditures before and after the 
introduction of EPF. Table 5 presents an index of provincial postsecondary 
education expenditures per full-time equivalent student from 1970-71 to 1982-83. 
Prior to 1977, the provinces received the 50:50 cost-sharing grant for financing 
postsecondary education. As a result of such a funding arrangement, provincial 
spending on postsecondary education increased steadily from 1970-71 to 
TABLE 5 
INDEXES OF PROVINCIAL POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION EXPENDITURE 
PER FULL TIME EQUIVALENT STUDENT 
(1970-71 = 100) 






Provinces 1970-71 1972-73 1974-•75 1976-•77 1977-•78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-•81 1981-•82 1982-83 
Nfld. 100.0 130.7 148. .3 156. ,5 147. ,3 156.6 152.2 148. ,8 123. ,0 112.0 
P.E.I. 100.0 109.6 90. .1 118. ,3 146. ,9 167.9 159.6 155. .8 115. ,0 112.6 
N.S. 100.0 121.3 126. ,5 116. ,5 111. .8 116.3 112.6 108. .9 108. .6 97.8 
N.B. 100.0 115.8 121. .5 161. .3 173. ,9 179.8 175.0 176. ,0 161. ,2 163.8 
Que. 100.0 134.9 133. ,6 149. .7 161. .0 160.5 156.2 154. ,5 155. ,3 144.4 
Ont. 100.0 104.6 92. .8 93. .8 98. .6 99.6 91 .0 83. .1 77, .8 75.1 
Man. 100.0 138.8 126. .9 133. .4 136. .1 124.6 126.5 117. ,5 115. .5 108.9 
Sask. 100.0 115.0 117. .6 131. .4 124. ,0 117.9 125.5 99. .3 113. .5 107.5 
Al ta. 100.0 103.4 87. .9 85. .9 90. .7 100.4 105.0 105. ,7 n i , .6 115.0 
B.C. 100.0 116.4 107. .9 111. .2 122. .0 131.2 142.6 140. .3 152, .8 124.9 
Canada 100.0 113.5 105. .6 110. .7 116. .3 118.2 115.3 110. .3 109. .8 103.7 
m o. 
Source: Computed from data in Statistics Canada, Provincial Government Finance: Revenue and Expenditure 
and Statistics Canada, Education in Canada. 
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1976-77.5 However, after the funding arrangement was switched from cost-
sharing to EPF in 1977, a somewhat different funding pattern emerged as 
illustrated in Table 5. Under the EPF arrangement, provincial postsecondary 
education expenditures declined gradually from 1978-79 onwards. Given the 
downward trend of provincial funding in the EPF period, it is clear that the 
provinces had reduced their expenditures on postsecondary education in response 
to the new funding arrangement. 
From the above discussion, it is apparent that provincial postsecondary 
education expenditures (in both per capita and per student terms) declined steadily 
since the introduction of EPF. More importantly, the upward funding trend was 
abruptly reversed after the inception of the EPF arrangement. This reflects the fact 
that the block grant under EPF had caused a reduction in provincial spending effort 
in the area of higher education. 
It should be noted that the above funding trends are analyzed only up to 
1982-83 because expenditure data are not available for 1983-84 and 1984-85. 
Given the expenditure pattern presented in this section, it is reasonable to expect 
that the provincial policy of expenditure restraint would continue both in 1983-84 
and in 1984-85. Perhaps the provincial spending cuts on postsecondary education 
would be even more striking if additional data were available for these two years. 
IMPLICATIONS 
On the basis of the preceding analysis, it is conceivable that there is a direct link 
between the EPF transfers and the provincial expenditures with respect to 
postsecondary education. First, unlike the previous cost-sharing scheme, the 
provinces were given more flexibility in the allocation of their own funds with 
respect to postsecondary education under the block funding arrangement. Since 
the block grant was unconditional, the provinces could spend the deemed EPF 
money on other programs if they preferred. In light of the growing budgetary 
deficits, the provinces were likely to divert the federal transfers designated for 
postsecondary education to other social programs. Under these circumstances, the 
provinces were tempted to cut back their expenditures on higher education because 
the EPF transfers were determined independently of provincial outlays. 
Second, under the EPF, there were large disparities in per capita provincial 
spending among the provinces. On a per capita basis, the richer provinces (e.g. 
Alberta and Quebec) tended to undertake more expenditures on postsecondary 
education than the poorer provinces (e. g. Prince Edward Island and NovaScotia).6 
More specifically, the EPF transfer had induced the richer provinces to contribute 
more funds to finance postsecondary education compared with the poorer 
provinces. As mentioned earlier, the funding formula enabled the provinces to 
receive equal per capita grants. The equality in per capita grants, however, did not 
lead to corresponding equality in the per capita provincial spending among the 
provinces. Given the large variations in provincial spending, it is questionable that 
interprovincial equity has been achieved under EPF. 
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Finally, most provinces took advantage of the EPF funding arrangement and 
reduced their spending significantly on higher education. This is reflected by the 
fact that there had been gradual reductions in the provincial expenditures on 
postsecondary education since the introduction of EPF. Although the recession 
could have restrained provincial postsecondary education expenditures, it is 
reasonable to assume that the EPF transfer was largely responsible for the decline 
in provincial spending on postsecondary education.7 This is because the 
unconditional federal transfers had in effect reduced the provincial spending 
incentive on postsecondary education.8 As a result of the unconditional nature of 
postsecondary education transfers coupled with overall budgetary restraints, 
universities and colleges were compelled to undertake substantial cutbacks to cope 
with the financial pinch. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In view of the funding trends presented in this study, it is evident that the provincial 
spending restraint had taken place in the area of postsecondary education since the 
introduction of EPF. Over the years, the block funding arrangement generously 
allowed the provinces to curtail their level of support for higher education. These 
results are not surprising because the observed pattern of provincial expenditures 
on postsecondary education is consistent with the predicted fiscal response that the 
stimulative effect of an unconditional grant on provincial expenditure is rather 
minimal. 
Under the EPF arrangement, the provincial governments received the federal 
transfer payments for financing postsecondary education in the form of an 
unconditional grant. In essence, the unconditional grant gave the provinces 
complete freedom in deciding their expenditure levels with respect to higher 
education. Since the provinces were not obliged to spend the federal transfers on 
postsecondary education, they were virtually free to spend the federal grants on 
any programs. Under these circumstances, there was a strong incentive for the 
provinces to divert the federal funds to some other programs that were more 
preferred by the provinces.9 Such a flexible funding formula inevitably enabled 
the provinces to cut back substantially their spending on postsecondary education. 
From the provincial perspective, the EPF funding scheme was an ideal form of 
transfer mechanism because it allowed the provinces to structure their own 
spending priorities without any loss of federal contributions. In contrast, the EPF 
arrangement was a complete failure from the federal government's standpoint 
since it did not encourage the provinces to maintain their relative level of financial 
support for postsecondary education, let alone to increase it. It can be argued that 
the EPF transfer was undesirable in that it was ineffective in maintaining a national 
standard in the area of postsecondary education. In order to prevent provincial use 
of postsecondary education grants for other purposes, a conditional matching grant 
should be used because it would compel the provinces to spend the designated 
federal funds only on postsecondary education. Certainly, whether such a funding 
scheme is politically feasible is another matter. 
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NOTES 
1. Throughout this paper, the term "postsecondary education" is used interchangeably with the term 
"higher education". 
2. In subsequent years, the cash contribution was escalated through time by the growth of the 
provincial population and the economy. The growth of the economy is based on a three-year moving 
average of the annual growth rate of nominal per capita GNP. 
3. As well, these five provinces contributed a lower proportion of their provincial budgets to higher 
education in 1982-83 than they did in 1977-78. 
4. Part-time enrolment is converted to full-time equivalent enrolment by using a factor of 3 to 1 (i.e. 3 
part-time students to 1 full-time student). 
5. Notwithstanding these increases, there was a slight decline in provincial postsecondary education 
expenditures in 1972-73 as the actual federal transfers were reduced by the imposition of a 15 
percent growth ceiling. 
6. The categorization of the provinces is based on the province's per capita personal income. The 
province whose per capita personal income above the national average is considered to be a rich 
province whereas the province whose per capita personal income below the national average is 
considered to be a poor province. 
7. In order to contain the growing budgetary deficits, the provinces had to cut back their expenditures 
on most public services. Since postsecondary education was traditionally not a top spending 
priority in the provincial budgets, the provinces were unlikely to treat postsecondary education 
more generously than health services and other public programs in the wake of overall budgetary 
cutbacks. 
8. According to the economic theory of grants, an unconditional grant involves an income effect 
whereas a conditional matching grant involves a price effect (a combination of the substitution and 
the income effects). It is expected that a conditional matching grant is more stimulative on 
provincial expenditure than an unconditional grant because the former has a price effect whereas the 
latter has only an income effect. 
9. As well, hospital insurance, medicare service, and social welfare programs are politically more 
visible to the public. 
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